Explanatory Coherence and the Impossibility of Confirmation by Coherence by Poston, Ted





The coherence of independent reports provides a strong reason to believe
that the reports are true. This plausible claim has come under attack from
recent results in Bayesian epistemology. Huemer (1997), Olsson (2002, 2005),
and Bovens and Hartmann (2003) prove that, under certain probabilistic con-
ditions, coherence cannot increase the probability of the target claim. These
results are taken to demonstrate that epistemic coherentism is untenable. To
date no one has investigated how these Bayesian results bear on different con-
ceptions of coherence. In this paper, I investigate these Bayesian results by us-
ing Paul Thagard’s ECHO model of explanatory coherence (Thagard (2000)).
Thagard’s ECHO model provides a natural representation of the evidential
significance of multiple independent reports. The ECHO model, in contrast to
the Bayesian models, captures the power of coherence in a witness scenario.
The conditions that Bayesian models found to be impossible, ECHO models
naturally accommodate. This demonstrates that there are different formal
tools for representing coherence. I close with a discussion of the differences
between the Bayesian model and the ECHO model.
The idea that the coherence of a body of information provides a reason for that
body of information has a long history. A clear early use of coherence reasoning
comes from Carneades, described by Sextus Empiricus as follows:
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Just as some doctors detect the genuine fever patient not from one symp-
tom, such as an excessive pulse or a severe high temperature, but from
a cluster [of symptoms], such as a high temperature as well as pulse and
soreness to the touch and flushing and thirst and similar things, so too
the Academic makes his judgment as to the truth by a cluster of appear-
ances.1
Carneades’s point is that judgment should be responsive to a mass (a cluster)
of evidence, not to a single isolated report. Meinong, writing in the early 20th
century, provides the following analogy of how coherence functions: “One may think
of playing cards. No one of them is capable of standing by itself, but several of them,
leaned against other, can serve to hold each other up.”2 Meinong’s analogy suggest
that a coherent body of information itself may provide reason to believe the claims
even though each individual item alone does not provide a reason to believe a claim.
The intuition that coherence is a unique source of justification is widespread.
Even so, a common objection is that this intuition requires an account of the nature
of coherence and no such account is forthcoming. A.C. Ewing channels this com-
mon compliant writing that apart from a clear account of coherence, the theory is
“reduced . . . to be mere uttering of a word, coherence, . . . rob[bing] it of almost all sig-
nificance.”3 Ewing’s compliant about the nature of coherence is still relevant. Even
though there have been multiple formal accounts on the nature of coherence, there is
no settled view about its nature.4 But formal epistemology has made progress on the
epistemology of coherence. Recent Bayesian results have shown that coherence can-
not provide confirmation unless the individual evidence itself provides confirmation.
These results are taken to be bad news for coherentism. Erik Olsson, for example,
writes,
Coherence cannot generate credibility from scratch when applied to in-
dependent data. Some reports must have a degree of credibility that is
prior to any consideration of coherence, or such agreement will fail to
have any effect whatsoever on the probability of what is reported.5
The formal results have been framed within Bayesian models. No one has inves-
tigated how these results bare on alternative models of coherence. In this paper I
1Sextus Empiricus (2005, 37).
2A. Meinong Uber Moglichkeit und Wahrscheinlichkeit (1915), p. 465.
3Ewing (1934, 246)
4See Roche (2013) for a recent overview of formal accounts of coherence.
5Olsson (2005, 69).
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use Paul Thagard’s ECHO model of coherence to model the witness agreement sce-
narios centrally at issue in the Bayesian coherence literature.6 I show that Thagard’s
ECHO model captures the coherentist judgment that isolated reports fail to confirm
whereas multiple reports do confirm. I then discuss what is driving the difference
between the ECHO models and the Bayesian models.
1 Witness Agreement and the impossibility of co-
herence
In this section I review the central witness agreement model and the early impossi-
bility results.
1.1 The witness agreement model
The Bayesian coherence literature picks up on C.I. Lewis’s model of coherence jus-
tification in his 1946 book An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation.7 Lewis’s key
observation is that coherence is best seen in the case in which multiple witnesses
report that the same event has occurred. When the witnesses are independent, he
claims that the agreement of the reports provides a powerful reason to accept the
report. Lewis explains,
Imagine a number of relatively unreliable witnesses who independently
tell the same circumstantial story. For any one of these reports, taken
singly, the extent to which it confirms what is reported may be slight.
And antecedently, the probability of what is reported may also be small.
But the congruence of the reports establishes a high probability of what
they agree upon.8
Lewis’s witness agreement model takes coherence to be agreement in content.
Two reports cohere when they report the same event. Lewis holds that coherence is
epistemically powerful when (i) the reports are independent and (ii) individually, the
reports have some positive, but small, bearing on the content of the claim. Under
these conditions Lewis thinks that the coherence of the reports bestows a significant





Laurence BonJour picks up on Lewis’s witness argument model in his defense of
a coherentist account of empirical justification. BonJour claims that the coherence
of witness reports is powerful even if each report, on its own, has no probabilistic
effect. He writes,
What Lewis does not see, however, is that his own example shows quite
convincingly that no antecedent degree of warrant or credibility is re-
quired. For as long as we are confident that the reports of the various
witnesses are genuinely independent of each other, a high enough degree
of coherence among them will eventually dictate the hypothesis of truth
telling as the only available explanation of their agreement.9
BonJour posits that the positive bump in credence that any individual report pro-
vides is not essential to the power of coherence. If the reports are independent from
one another then coherence alone provides a powerful reason to think the content
is true. BonJour’s thought is twofold: (i) rational belief is not moved by individual
testimonial reports but (ii) rational belief is moved by the coherence of the individual
testimonies.
1.2 Huemer’s anti-coherence theorem
Whether or not BonJour is right is a crucial question for the viability of epistemic
coherentism. Can coherence increase the justification of a body of claims without
first requiring that those claims have some justification independent of coherence?
Michael Huemer’s (1997) paper attempts to answer this question by interpreting
BonJour’s intuition as formal constraints on a probabilistic model. In the following
I briefly explain Huemer’s theorem and its purported significance.10
Let us begin with some terminology. Let Wi,A indicate that witness i reports A.
BonJour’s claim that the witness reports need no antecedent degree of credibility
may be understood thusly:
No Cred: P (A | Wi,A) = P (A).11
In contrast Lewis’s model assumes that the witness reports have, at least, some small
degree of credibility. That is,
9BonJour (1985, 148)
10Huemer (1997)
11There’s a tacit universal quantifier ranging over witness i. This condition should be read “for
any witness i the prior probability of A is unmoved by i’s report that A.” The other conditions
below should be read similarly.
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Cred: P (A | Wi,A) > P (A).
In these claims, and throughout the paper, we should understand probability
as rational credence.12 (No Cred) specifies that a single witness report does not
move rational credence. The idea is that if one lacks any relevant information about
whether the witnesses report truthfully then one shouldn’t change one’s credence in
the claim thus reported.
The next feature of BonJour’s intuition is that the witnesses are genuinely inde-
pendent of each other. If the witnesses are independent, then, BonJour thinks, the
coherence of their reports provides a powerful reason to believe that the reports are
true. This is modeled in terms of conditional independence. This is,
Conditional Independence:
(1) P (Wj,A | Wi,A ∧ A) = P (Wj,A | A)
(2) P (Wj,A | Wi,A ∧ ¬A) = P (Wj,A | ¬A)
(1) specifies that one’s credence that j will report A is responsive to A alone;
another witness testimony is screened off by A. (2) specifies the same thing with
respect to ¬A. (1) and (2) are what we’d expect for witnesses who are causally
independent of each other.13
BonJour’s intuition can then be understood as saying that under the conditions
of no individual credibility and conditional independence, the agreement of multiple
witness reports provides powerful evidence that the reports are true. That is,
BonJour’s Formal Intuition: It is possible that P (A | Wi,A ∧Wj,A) >
P (A) even if (i) P (A | Wi,A) = P (A), (ii) P (A | Wj,A) = P (A), and (ii)
the reports are conditionally independent.
This is intended to capture BonJour’s thought that the coherence of reports can
provide a reason to believe a claim even if the reports individually do not first provide
such a reason.
BonJour’s intuition, thus formalized, conflicts with a theorem of probability that
under these conditions, the agreement of multiple reports does not change the rele-
vant prior probability.
Huemer’s theorem: P (A | Wi,A∧Wj,A) = P (A) when (i) P (A | Wi,A) =
P (A), (ii) P (A | Wj,A) = P (A), and the reports are conditionally inde-
pendent.
12See Maher (2006, 2010)
13See Olsson (2002, 262) for a discussion on the reasons for conditional independence.
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Huemer’s theorem is easily proved from two consequences of (No Cred). First,
(No Cred) implies that learning that A occurs does not change one’s credence that
witness i testifies that A. That is, the following is true:
(†) P (A | Wi,A) = P (A) ⇐⇒ P (Wi,A | A) = P (Wi,A).
(†) is to be expected when one lacks any knowledge about whether witness i
tracks A. If one’s prior credence in A is unmoved by a report that A then one ought
to think that independently learning A doesn’t change one’s credence that i reports
A. Similarly, if learning that A doesn’t change one’s prior credence that i reports
A then learning that i reports A doesn’t change one’s credence that A. Thus, (†)
implies that i’s report that A is like background noise with respect to A.
Second, (No Cred) implies one’s credence that i reports A is the same condi-
tional A or ¬A. That is,
(‡) P (A | Wi,A) = P (A) ⇐⇒ P (Wi,A | A) = P (Wi,A | ¬A).
A natural way to understand (‡) is that individual witness reports are not re-
sponsive at all to the relevant facts. Rather the relationship between the individual
reports and the relevant facts is the same as the relationship between individual flips
of a fair coin. Just as there is no evidential relationship between the 1st flip of a fair
coin and the 2nd flip of a fair coin, there is no evidential relationship between i’s
report that A occurred and A’s occurrence.
Given (†) and (‡), Huemer’s theorem is easily proved.14 Olsson (2005) provides
a fuller discussion of the impossibility results. Olsson, among other things, extends
Huemer’s negative results to models that include multiple hypotheses about witness
reliability. Huemer (2011) finds a different set of probabilistic conditions that is
compatible with confirmation by coherence, but these conditions require abandoning
both conditional independence and no individual credibility. Olsson (2017) argues
that coherence should be explicated in terms of conditional independence and no
individual credibility. In the following I explore Thagard’s ECHO model of the
powerful of multiple coherent witness reports.
2 Coherence Maximization Model
Let us examine how the witness agreement conception of coherence can be modeled
within Thagard’s puzzle-solving conception of coherence.15 We start with the idea
14I leave the proof as an exercise for the reader.
15Thagard (2000)
6
that a given set of propositions may stand in either positive or negative coherence
relations to each other, though some propositions may be unrelated. Coherence
relations are understood in terms of the following principles:
• E1: Symmetry Explanatory coherence is a symmetric relation, unlike, say,
conditional probability. That is, two propositions p and q cohere with each
other equally.
• E2: Explanation (a) A hypothesis coheres with what it explains, which can
either be evidence or another hypothesis; (b) hypotheses that together explain
some other proposition cohere with each other; and (c) the more hypotheses it
takes to explain something, the lower the degree of coherence.
• E3: Analogy Similar hypotheses that explain similar pieces of evidence co-
here.
• E4: Data priority Propositions that describe the results of observations have
a degree of acceptability on their own.
• E5: Contradiction Contradictory propositions are incoherent with each other.
• E6: Competition If p and q both explain a proposition, and if p and q are
not explanatorily connected, then p and q are incoherent with each other. (p
and q are explanatorily connected if one explains the other or if together they
explain something.)
• E7: Acceptance The acceptability of a proposition in a system of propositions
depends on its coherence with them.16
Principle E4, Data Priority, is a special principle akin to epistemic conservatism.
The idea is that one accepts data reports and then the rest of the principles determine
the evidential significance of the reports. There is a similar conception of reports
in the Bayesian witness agreement model. It is assumed that one has evidence that
the reports occur, but at issue is the evidential significance of the reports.17 The
question in the Bayesian models is whether coherence bears on evidential power of
the reports in mass to indicate that the content of the reports is true. So applied
16Thagard (2000, 43). See also Thagard (1989); Thagard and Verbeurgt (1998)
17It is not often made explicit in the Bayesian witness argument models but one’s credence in
each witness report is 1. This tracks the standard Bayesian line that conditionalization requires
that evidence is learned with certainty. The anti-coherence theorems can be proven for Jeffrey
conditionalization as well.
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the puzzle-solving conception of coherence, starts with a body of claims that are
coherent and incoherent in various ways and attempts to determine a scoring rule
that will guide which subset of these claims should be accepted and which rejected.
In the following I layout a general approach to a coherence problem that explains
the foundations of Thagard’s ECHO model without appealing to Thagard’s specific
neural network algorithm.18
We begin with the idea that coherence and incoherence is a two-place relation
between propositions. The coherence of a body of information is maximized when the
positive and negative constraints are maximized. A positive explanatory constraint
between two propositions is satisfied when both propositions are accepted. A negative
explanatory constraint between two claims is satisfied when one is accepted and the
other is rejected.
Let us examine how this works in a simple model. Consider a set of informa-
tion that consists of two reports e1 and e2 and two hypotheses h1 and h2 which
offer competing explanations of the evidence. We then have the following set of
information: {e1, e2, h1, h2}. Hypotheses h1 and h2 contradict each other. h1 ex-
plains e1 and e2 while h2 explains only e2. We then characterize a set of posi-
tive constraints and a set of negative constraints. The set of positive constraints
is this: C+ = {(e1, h1), (e2, h1), (e2, h2)}. The set of negative constraints is this:
C− = {(h1, h2)}. Our coherence problem is then to find a partition of E into ac-
cepted claims and rejected claims that satisfies the most constraints.
We can represent this information in terms of an undirected graph. The solid
lines between nodes represent a positive explanatory constraint. The dotted line
represents a negative explanatory constraint.
A simple coherence problem
E1 E2
H1 H2
What partition of E has the highest coherence score? There are 4 propositions
in E. So there are 24 = 16 partitions of E into accepted and rejected items. Let us
look at two partitions. First, let us consider a partition that accepts h2 and e2 and
rejects h1 and e1. This is the following: P1 : A = {h2, e2};R = {h1, e1}. P1 satisfies
one positive explanatory constraint in virtue of accepting h2 and e2, and it satisfies
18For the specific details of his neural network algorithm see Thagard (2000, 30–34)
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one negative explanatory constraint in virtue of accepting h2 and rejecting h1. P1
has an explanatory coherence score of 2.
P1 rejects e1 and h1 thus leaving the positive constraint between those claim
unsatisfied. Consider a different partition P2 : A = {h1, e1, e2};R = {h2}. This
partition satisfies two positive explanatory constraints by accepting h1, e1,&e2. It
also satisfies the negative constraint by accepting h1 and rejecting h2. It thus has
a higher explanatory coherence score than P1. By inspection of the 16 possible
partitions we see that P2 has the highest coherence score. Hence, we have the most
reason to accept h1, e1,&e2 and reject h2.
This coherence maximization process can be done by exhaustive search among
the 2n partitions for n elements. For each partition sum all the satisfied constraints.
If a partition beats all the other partitions then one has the most reason to accept its
accepted elements and reject its rejected elements. The representation of constraints
can be made finer by adding weights to the positive and negative constraints. If
h1 is a much better explanation of e1 than h2 is of the same evidence then we can
represent that in terms of the relative magnitude of the numbers attached to the
explanatory relation. Also, if some evidential statements have special significance
this can be model in terms of the relation of the item of evidence to a unit, denoted
‘special’. It then becomes a positive constraint that enters into the overall coherence
score.
Thagard’s ECHO model differs from this coherence maximization model only in
terms of its efficiency in handling a large number of propositions and constraints. The
algorithm he uses is designed to be a more efficient method of finding the partition
with the highest score than an exhaustive search method. But while ECHO has the
advantage of modeling a large number of constraints, it is not guaranteed to find
the partition with the highest score. Furthermore, in the applications of coherence
reasoning that drive our interest we can work with the simpler exhaustive search
procedure.19
3 Coherence Maximization & Witness Agreement
models
Let us consider how this coherence maximization method models a witness agreement
scenario. I begin with the case of a single isolated report and then turn to multiple
witness reports.
19In practice I will use various heuristics to find the partition with the highest score.
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3.1 A single isolated report
The coherence maximization method begins with a body of evidence and then adds
potential explanations to that body of evidence. Let us apply this in the case of a
single witness report in which we know nothing about the reliability of the witness.
This includes that we don’t know any general background information that would
provide reason to think that the witness was more or less reliable on this occasion.
In this case we have an isolated witness of unknown reliability who reports that
A. Consider two explanations of W’s report that A. The first explanation is that
the report is true and the witness is reliable on these matters. As a simplifying
assumption, let us represent this conjunctive explanation as the single hypothesis
that the witness is truthful. I use ‘truthful’ in a technical sense of ‘being reliable
and reporting the truth.’ The second explanation is that the report is false and
that the witness is misleading on these matters. Again to simplify the model, let us
represent this conjunctive explanation as the single hypothesis that the witness is
misleading. Then we have the following explanatory relations: (i) that W is truthful
explains why W said A; (ii) that W is misleading explains why W said A; (iii) the
two explanations compete with each other.
Single Witness Model
• EVIDENCE
E1: W reports that A
• HYPOTHESES
H1: W is truthful.
H2: W is misleading.
• EXPLANATIONS
X1: H1 explains E1
X2: H2 explain E1.
• COMPETES
C1: H1 conflicts with H2
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Our set of information here is E = {e1, h1, h2}. The positive constraints are:
C+ = {(e1, h1), (e1, h2)} and the negative constraints are: C− = {(h1, h2)}. There
are 23 possible partitions but only 22 which include e1. Since we can’t accept both h1
and h2 we can rule out that partition and the partition in which both explanations
are rejected will not satisfy any positive explanatory constraints. We are left with
two partitions.
1. P1 : A = {e1, h1};R = {h2}. Coherence score = 2
2. P2 : A = {e1, h2};R = {h1}. Coherence score = 2
We can see that this coherence maximization model does not favor either hypoth-
esis. This result shows that an isolated report by a witness of unknown reliability
does not favor either the truth-telling hypothesis or the misleading hypothesis. It is
natural to understand this result as indicating that one’s credence that A is unmoved
by a single isolated report. This result is precisely what would be expected given the
setup that we don’t know anything about the reliability of the witness.
3.2 Multiple witness reports
With a single witness report the ECHO model indicates that the report has no
individual credibility. The situation changes dramatically with multiple witness re-
ports in exactly the way that BonJour original thought anticipates. For, recall, that
BonJour focuses on plausible explanations of the agreement of multiple independent
witness and he reasons that eventually the agreement will be, otherwise so surpris-
ingly, that truth-telling is the only plausible hypothesis.20 As we’ll see the evidential
situation with multiple witness reports is much richer than the single witness case.
Let us describe this situation. We start with the reports of two witnesses who
both report that A. Our evidence includes “W1 reports that A” and “W2 reports
that A”. It follows that that we have also as evidence that “W1 and W2 report
the same event.” BonJour’s intuition included that the witnesses are independent
from each other. We do not need to build in this assumption at the level of evidence;
rather we add that we have as evidence that “W1 and W2 have no observed contact.”
We have the following evidence set.
evidence
E1: W1 reports that A.
20BonJour (1985, 148)
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E2: W2 reports that A.
E3: W1 and W2 report the same event.
E4: W1 and W2 have no observed contact.
We immediately see a difference in evidence between the case of a single witness
report and the case of multiple witness reports. There are, of course, more reports.
But of greater significance, there is the evidence that the reports agree and that that
the witnesses do not appear to have coordinated their reports. These differences also
expand the range of explanatory hypotheses.
What is the hypothesis space for multiple witness reports? As with a single
witness report, we have two hypotheses corresponding to whether the witness is a
truthful or misleading as understood in the technical sense given above. Also, we
consider the hypothesis that the witnesses are independent from each other and
the competing hypothesis that the witness are colluding. We have the following
hypothesis space.
hypotheses
H1: W1 is truthful.
H2: W1 is misleading.
H3: W2 is truthful.
H4: W2 is misleading.
H5: W1 and W2 are independent.
H6: W1 and W2 are colluding.
Next we specify the positive explanatory relationship. We have the following:
explanations
X1: H1 explains E1.
X2: H2 explains E1.
X3: H3 explains E2.
X4: H4 explains E2.
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X5: H1 & H3 & H5 explain E3.
X6: H2 & H4 & H6 explain E3.
X7: H5 explains E4.
That W1 is truthful, that is in our technical sense that W1 is reliable and A is true,
explains why she said A. This is similar to the above single witness model. That the
witnesses are both truthful together with the fact that they are independent explains
why they reported the same event. Moreover, the hypothesis that the witnesses
are independent explains why we do not observe any contact between them. The
hypothesis of independence thus can figure in two explanations of the evidence.
Further, the hypotheses that the witnesses are misleading, that is in our technical
sense that they are unreliable and that A is false, do not explain the evidence that
the witnesses report the same thing. To get an explanatory connection we need to
add an additional hypothesis that the witnesses are colluding, i.e., H6. But note that
H6 is in tension with our evidence that the witnesses have no observed contact.
The negative explanatory relations are the following.
contradictions
C1: H1 conflicts with H2.
C2: H3 conflicts with H4.
C3: H5 conflicts with H6.
The model for multiple witness reports is much richer than a single witness report.
We have more evidence and more hypotheses to consider. Let us then work out in
detail how the ECHO model issues a verdict about which partition of the information
set has the highest coherence score. Recall that the information set consists of the
evidence and the potential explanations. In the multiple witness model we have this
information set:
E = {e1, e2, e3, e4, h1, h2, h3, h4, h5, h6}
Given our characterization of positive and negative explanatory constraints, we
have the following sets of constraints:
C+ ={(e1, h1), (e1, h2), (e2, h3), (e2, h4), (e3, h1), (e3, h3), (e3, h5), (h1, h3), (h1, h5),
(h3, h5), (e3, h2), (e3, h4), (e3, h6), (h2, h4), (h2, h6), (h4, h6), (e4, h5)}
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I leave it to the reader to verify that each element of C+ tracks a positive ex-
planatory constraint. We have the following negative constraints.
C− = {(h1, h2), (h3, h4), (h5, h6)}
Given E, C+, and C-, our task to consider whether there is a partition with the
highest coherence score. An exhaustive search algorithm would consider each of the
210 = 1024 partitions and determine whether one has the highest coherence score.
We can apply some heuristics to trim the space of partitions. One heuristic is to
consider only partitions that accept all the evidence statements. This leaves us with
26 partitions. We can then further trim the space of partition by considering the set
of negative constraints. We see, for instance, that satisfying the negative constraint
requires accepting exactly one of h5, h6. We can then look to see if one of these
hypotheses stands in more positive relations than the other. By inspection, we see
that h5 explains e4 and h6 doesn’t. Otherwise, h5 and h6 stand in the same number of
explanatory relations. Thus we consider the partition that accepts all the evidence,
h5, and all other claims that bear positive relations to h5. We thus get this partition.
P ∗ : A = {e1, e2, e3, e4, h5, h3, h1};R = {h2, h4, h6}
P ∗ has a coherence score of 12. By inspection, no partition has a higher coherence
score. This model suggests that with an information set of E we have the most reason
to accept that the witnesses are truthful and hence we should accept that their claim
is true.
3.3 Discussion
The ECHO model of multiple witness reports fits BonJour’s original intuition that,
while an isolated report doesn’t confirm the content of the report, multiple indepen-
dent witness reports do confirm the report. Why does the ECHO model differ from
the Bayesian model with respect to the power of coherence? To answer this question
let us describe another witness agreement case in which both a Bayesian model and
ECHO model are in agreement.
Coin-flipping witnesses: Suppose there are a pair of witnesses, Tim
and Tam, who will observe an event, E, and will report either E or not E.
Tim and Tam, though, will issue their individual reports by each flipping
a fair coin. If the coin lands heads then report E; otherwise report not
E. Both Tim and Tam flip a coin and it lands heads for both. They both
report E.
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It is clear that coherence of Tim’s report and Tam’s report does not provide
any reason to think that E is true. But this case satisfies the assumptions of no-
individual credibility and conditional independence. No-individual credibility re-
quires that P (E | TimE) = P (E) and P (E | TamE) = P (E), where ‘TimE’ and
‘TamE’ are that Tim reports E and Tam reports E. Conditional Independence is this
claim: P (TimE | E&TamE) = P (TimE | E) (mutatis mudantis, for Tam’s report
that E). In this specific case, the Bayesian model delivers precisely the correct ver-
dict. The agreement of Tim’s report and Tam’s report provides no reason to believe
E.
An ECHO model of the coin-flipping witnesses does not include the hypotheses
that the witnesses are truthful because the setup rules out the possibility that the
reports are generated by truth-telling. Rather the relevant explanatory hypothesis
for the reports are whether or not the individual coins landed heads. Accordingly,
the ECHO model is the following:
evidence
E1: Tim reports that E.
E2: Tam reports that E.
E3: Tim and Tam report the same event.
hypotheses
H1: Tim’s coin lands heads.
H2: Tam’s coin lands heads.
H3: Tim’s coin lands tails.
H4: Tam’s coin lands tails.
explanations
X1: H1 explains E1.
X2: H2 explains E2.
X3: H1 & H2 explain E3.
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contradictions
C1: H1 conflicts with H3.
C2: H2 conflicts with H4.
C3: H3 conflicts with E1.
C4: H4 conflicts with E2.
The reader can verify that the partition with the highest coherence score accepts
H1 and H2 and rejects H3 and H4. The key is that H3 and H4 conflict with the
evidence while H1 and H2 explain the evidence. Of special note is that no hypothesis
in this ECHO model invokes the truth or falsity of E and hence no verdict of this
model is relevant to whether E is true.21
The crucial difference between the coin-flipping ECHO model and the witness
agreement ECHO model lies in this area. In the coin-flipping model, there are
no hypotheses pertaining to witness reliability and no hypotheses that bear on the
truth of E. But in the witness agreement model, there are such hypotheses. In the
coin-flipping case, agreement doesn’t indicate that the witnesses are reliable, but
in the witness agreement case it does indicate that the witnesses are reliable. This
key difference is glossed over in the Bayesian models assuming that no individual
credibility holds both in the single witness case and in the multiple witness case.
That is, it is a constraint on the Bayesian model that P (A | Wi,A) = P (A) for each
witness i. In the case where there is only one witness this is true and in the case
in which there are multiple witnesses this is true. Using ECHO, though, we are
led to treat the single case differently from the case involving multiple witnesses.
In the single case the evidence and the explanatory hypotheses do not give us any
reason to think that A is more likely to be true than not. Hence the witness’s report
that A doesn’t provide any reason to believe A. But in the multiple witness case
the evidence and explanatory hypotheses do provide us reason to think that the
witnesses are reporting the truth and hence that the content is true.
The upshot of this discussion is that the assumption of no-individual credibility
is too strong in the Bayesian models. The effect of coherence in the multiple witness
case involves changing one’s relevant conditional probabilities. Prior to learning that
there are multiple witness reports in agreement, one’s conditional probability that
a claim is true given a single witness report is the same as the probability of the
report. But after learning that independent witnesses report the same event, one
21A different ECHO model can include as hypotheses E and not E. In this case, two partitions
would be tied for highest coherence score–one that includes E and one that doesn’t.
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is rationally moved to favor the hypothesis that the witnesses are telling the truth
and in that case the assumption of no-individual credibility is false. The surprising
agreement is best explained by the otherwise surprising claim that the witnesses are
individually credible.22
4 Conclusion
The intuition that the agreement of multiple independent witnesses is evidentially
powerful even if each witness lacks individual credibility is powerful. I’ve argued
that while a Bayesian model of this case conflicts with the intuition, Thagard’s
ECHO model is able to capture the intuition. Moreover, reflection on the difference
between the ECHO model and the Bayesian model reveals a crucial assumption in
the Bayesian models that conditional probabilities relating to a witnesses credibility
cannot change in response to the evidence that multiple witnesses report the same
event.
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